来源：科研处 发布时间：2012-09-06 浏览：次
长江商学院刘挺军讲座
题目： Targeting target shareholders
报告人：Tingjun Liu （刘挺军，长江商学院）
时间：9月13日（周四）15：30-17：00
地点：博学楼1120会议室
论文摘要:
We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers. Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in firms they value more highly, and a successful offer must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the consequences for an acquiring firm's takeover offer—-its size and cash/equity structure—-and implications for takeover premia and firm returns. Cash offers are optimal when the acquirer's private valuation is high relative to target shareholders; while equity offers are optimal when the reverse holds. The acquirer's share price always rises following cash acquisitions. The combined target-acquirer return is always higher after a cash acquisition than an equity acquisition (which can be negative). We characterize how synergies and the extent of uncertainty about target shareholder valuations affect the optimal offer and probability a takeover succeeds.
