龚炯讲座（Criminalizing Employee Negligence）

报告人：龚炯（对外经济贸易大学）

题目： Criminalizing Employee Negligence

时间：9月27日（周四）15：30-17：00

地点：博学楼1120室

论文摘要：Invoking criminal law to indict corporate negligence has a long history in both Europe and the US. However, charging corporate employees of criminal offenses of negligence is a recent new development in Europe, and it has aroused much attention among the legal community in the US. Proponents of criminalizing employee negligence point to the deterrent effect in preventing catastrophic accidents. Opponents are concerned about information sharing after accident investigations, which can help prevent future accidents. We build an inter-temporal negligence-and-punishment model to investigate the impact of criminalizing employee negligence. We find that criminalization internalizes the incentive to the employee, which is previously absent without it. By inducing the employee to exert more effort so as to avoid the risk of negligence conviction, the firm is able to reduce the liability exposure of an accident, while the society overall benefits from a smaller expected accident loss.