5月20日，焦倩（中山大学岭南（大学）学院）

报告人：焦倩（中山大学岭南（大学）学院）

时间：2021年5月20日（周四）下午15:00-16:30

地点：线上腾讯会议（会议号：786 985 902，密码：135246）

报告题目：Optimal Prize Design in Team Contests

主持人：李建培

摘要：This paper studies effort-maximizing prize designs in team contests with an arbitrary number of pairwise battles. The organizer rewards the teams contingent on battle outcomes subject to budget balance constraints. Our analysis fully accommodates heterogeneities across players and battles. We discover an innovative measure of the teams' strengths. The optimal design is a majority-score rule with a headstart score for the weaker team: all battles are assigned team-invariant scores; the team collecting higher total scores from its winning battles wins the entire prize. The optimal design is robust to homogeneity-of-degree-zero contest technologies and contest temporal structure.

报告人简介：焦倩，现任中山大学岭南（大学）学院副教授，于2012年在新加坡国立大学获得经济学博士学位。研究领域包括应用微观理论、竞争于拍卖和产业组织理论，并主持国家自然科学基金项目和教育部人文社会科学基金项目。研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，International Journal of Game Theory等多种知名学术期刊。

报告人主页：http://lingnan.sysu.edu.cn/faculty/jiaoqian